the Victorians 8 is not ostensibly about India. An account of England's role in the partition of Africa, it nevertheless demonstrates at every point how, and how far, this was affected by England's paramount interest in the routes to the east. The best chapters are about Egypt and the Upper Nile Valley. This is not the place to discuss the intricacies of the Near Eastern Question, but as Robinson and Gallagher failed to provide a bibliography, the bibliographies in Sanderson* and Langer 10 may be used instead.
Historians of Africa nowadays criticize Robinson and Gallagher for ignoring what was happening there. As far as they could, so did English statesmen at the time. The English, as Wilde's Lady Bradknell understood, have always valued ignorance. They are not a professional people. In Africa the English usually succeeded in pursuing their imperial policies unaffected by local distractions; partitioning territories along rivers or lines of longitude. There were no equivalents in Asia. In particular there was no satisfactory frontier at whidi to defend India: the British had spent the 19th century seardiing for one. Every historical precedent advised against waiting for an invader to debouch from the Himalayas and fighting him at the Indus. The experience of the First Afghan War in 1841 advised against fighting beyond the Himalayas, when the passes were controlled by hostile tribes. There were other possibilities, fighting in Europe or the Persian Gulf. In succession eadi of them proved impracticable.
In the late 19th century the defence of India was a far more refractory problem than the partition of Africa. The problem was caused by the apparently unending and unstoppable expansion of Russia south eastwards across Turkestan. Starting after the Crimean War, 25 years later the Russians were at the frontier of Afghanistan. They advanced in two directions, from Orenburg through Bokhara first to Balkh and later to Chitral, and from the Caspian Sea through Merv towards Herat. Had the Russians seized Herat, and made it the terminus of their railway, the Hindu Kush, the traditional barrier to an invasion of India from the north west, would have been turned. The best account of the first half of this expansion is the English translation of Khaflin Khaflin criticizes the English for being unduly suspicious of Russia, but they were not alone in expecting the Russians to use their position in Central Asia to embarrass the English in India. After the Indian Mutiny in 1857, the English lived in terror of rebellion. They were as sensitive to developments on their north west frontier, and for the same reason, as the Russians had once been sensitive to developments on the frontiers of Poland: upheaval, as Metternich had always argued, was contagious. Two short accounts of Russian expansion can be found in the opening chapters of Pierce 12 and Kazemzadeh". Both Pierce and Kazemzadeh are useful for understanding Russian policy, but Kazemzadeh is disappointing about English. This is because he has not used private papers. Between 1876 and 1900, when Lord Salisbury played the dominant role in formulating English foreign policy, it cannot be understood without them, if only because Salisbury usually revealed what he was thinking in private letters. The opposite warning must be given about the book that is the obvious introduction to this subject for German readers, Braun 14 , who has read numerous collections of private papers but no Foreign Office correspondence. His book should have been longer and more detailed; but it remains more useful than its older French equivalent". The defence of India is as refractory a problem for scholars as it was then for officials, because it requires you to work in the Foreign Office, War Office, and India Office archives. As Thornton demonstrated in his work on Persia and Afghanistan 1 ', in the middle of the 19th century there were as many solutions offered to the problem of how to defend India as there were opinions asked. By the 1870's these had crystallized around two groups, usually described as the Punjab and Bombay Schools. Similarly, until 1885, when Gladstone ceased to have any influence over English foreign policy, the Liberals were associated with the Punjab School and the Conservatives with Bombay. The polarization appeared to be most complete in 1880, a result of the disasters of the Second Afghan War. Until 1876, when Disraeli, then Prime Minister, appointed Lord Lytton Viceroy of India, to implement his decision to reassert English influence throughout the world, the views of the Punjab School had determined the defence of India. Adherents of Lord Lawrence, Viceroy from 1863 to 1868, who had spent his earlier years in the Punjab, they believed that Russia should be restrained as far as possible by diplomatic means, that treaties with or expeditions to Persia or Afghanistan would prove impracticable as a means of restraint, and, that should war break out between England and Russia, England should stand on the defensive in India and attack Russia in Europe and the Far East. There is a succinct summary of their attitude in Gopal"; and Moultan provides a more detailed account of Lord NorthbrookViceroy from 1872 to 1876, who resigned rather than carry out the forward policy Disraeli and Salisbury were demanding. In India defence policy had to be coordinated with frontier policy. The Punjab Sdiool operated a closed border on the north west frontier. Nobody was permitted to cross from India; tribesmen might cross into British territory to trade. Armed raids by tribesmen were repulsed by punitive expeditions, sent as far into the mountains as necessary, but detachments were not based beyond the frontier. There was a political corollary: internal politics in the Central Asian states need not concern the English. They should recognize anyone who could obtain power, but assist nobody to do so: their policy, in a famous phrase, should be one of "masterly inactivity". The Bombay Sdiool, adherents of Sir Bartle Frere, Governor of Bombay 1862-1867, argued that the native states might be ignored as long as their hostility to Russia could be assumed. As soon as the expansion of Russia implied the threat of their subservience, the English needed sufficiently friendly relations to obtain accurate information of Russian activities. They also needed a scientific frontier beyond the mountains, and garrisons at Kandahar and Ghazni, because the best method of defence was the offensive. The disagreement in the 1860's and 1870's, the last years of Whig predominance in English politics, about how to defend India, reflected a similar disagreement about the likelihood of rebellion. The Whigs, who had fought the Crimean War to buy time for rejuvenating Turkey, had been equally confident of anglicizing India. During the 1870's they were disillusioned. Robinson and Gallagher have charted the stages of their disillusion in terms of British intervention in Egypt. It might be charted in terms of Indian defence. Hambly suggested that Northbrook had resisted Disraeli's forward policy, because it might aggravate the unrest in Northern India The Conservatives, adherents of the Bombay Sdiool, answered that a forward policy was needed precisely because of this unrest. The English could not afford to defend India on the Indus, either from invasion or foreign influence, when any setback, however small, might provoke rebellion. To reduce both the danger of unrest, and the expense of being constantly prepared for war, India must be defended far away in Central Asia, in alliance with Persia or Afghanistan. The tendency of British India to expand was well analysed by Galbraith The last dramatic expansion was the Second Afghan War. If the English were to defend India in Central Asia, they needed accurate information about the Russian advance. Unfortunately the Afghans would not admit English agents into Afghanistan, because they distrusted English motives. Their refusal was one of the causes of England's second disastrous attempt in 1878/79 to defend India beyond the Himalayas by placing a puppet king upon the throne of Kabul. To garrison Afghanistan was strategically impossible while the passes from India could be closed by hostile tribes. There is no satisfactory account of the Second Afghan War. Singhal is confused and too unsympathetic to Northbrook's successor as Viceroy, Lord Lytton 31 . Cowling provides an excellent account of the start of the war", and Chaudary explains its effects in encouraging Indian nationalismBy its defeat the forward policy in Afghanistan provoked the unrest it was intended to prevent.
Lytton's administration in India, between 1876 and 1880, had demonstrated how difficult it was to restrain an headstrong Viceroy. Lytton, who had been encouraged by Disraeli, who calculated that England might restrain Russia in the Balkans during the Great Eastern Crisis by threatening offensives in the Black Sea and Central Asia, continued the policy, and provoked a crisis with Afghanistan, after Disraeli at the Congress of Berlin had resolved England's differences with Russia by negotiation. When Disraeli was defeated in the general election of 1880, Lytton resigned, or he would have been recalled, and was succeeded by the Earl of Ripon. Gopal's account of the policy of Ripon reveals that, however determined Gladstone might have been to reverse Disraeli's policy, and retreat behind the northwest frontier, it was impossible". Afghanistan was evacuated, but the English maintained a forward position beyond the Indus in Baluchistan, whence they might strike if necessary towards Kandahar. This meant that they had to find a method of pacifying the hill tribes, or at least to persuade them to recognize the English frontier 2 \ Gladstone was partly hampered by, and partly exploited, the connexions between the simultaneous crises in different parts of the world. When prevented from evacuating Egypt, he insisted upon giving Home Rule to Ireland. He stood firm against the Russians over Penjdeh in 1884, as an excuse to insist upon evacuating the Sudan. That England had been too heavily committed in too many parts of the world had been his argument against Disraeli. The best account of how imperial strategy was formulated by the Liberals is to be found in Agatha Ramm's short but penetrating introduction to the correspondence between Gladstone and his Foreign Secretary Between 1885 and 1914 British foreign policy, in contrast to the previous 20 years, was remarkably consistent. The reason for this was partly the enigma of Lord Rosebery, who exploited his fame as a racehorse owner, first to seize control of Liberal foreign policy, then to bequeath it to his Liberal Imperialist disciple, Sir Edward Grey. While there is no recent biography of Salisbury, because Kennedy' 7 The result, in overburdening the Commander-in-Chief, was partly responsible in 1914 for the confusion in Mesopotamia. Roberts and Kitchener are the two soldiers best remembered for their work in defence of India. The foundations had been laid for them by Sir Charles MacGregor. Preston's account of MacGregor's work to equip the Indian Army in the eighteen sixties and seventies to take the offensive in Central Asia is the best piece of work on this subject ,e . The different priorities of generals were reflected in differences between the Viceroys. Ripon's successor, the Earl of Dufferin, Viceroy 1884-1888, persuaded the Amir of Afghanistan to accept the frontier demanded by Russia, while expanding the strategic railways on the north west frontier. In this he was followed by his successor, the Marquis of Lansdowne, Viceroy 1888-1894, who under the influence of Roberts argued for railways into Baluchistan and Afghanistan. Salisbury always supported railways, particularly in Persia, but he and Rosebery did not share the alarmist assumptions on which Roberts' proposals were based. During the 1890's, policy for the defence of India was increasingly formulated at London, where the English Government appeared increasingly hesitant to act. Not until 1899, when Curzon arrived in India, did the Government of India successfully demand vigorous initiatives to recover what they argued to be diminishing English influence throughout the Near East. The defence of India was as much a diplomatic as a military problem. The English had a frontier to defend, but because their enemy was not their neighbour, except in the remote fastnesses of the Pamirs, they could not build strategic railways, the crux of late 19th century military planning, if they were likely to offend the neighbouring buffer states, whose goodwill English agents were simultaneously striving to cultivate. There were five areas in which the English were active. As the north west frontier was the most sensitive in India, it will be preferable to start in the east. The best books on the defence of the eastern frontiers of India are by Lamb 17 , who explains in detail the origins of Curzon's forward policy at the turn of the century, its disavowal by Grey, and the complications caused by Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. There are four works that supplement Lamb, by Elwin", Mehra ' the 19th century 10 , and Chakravorty's of the difficulty of pacifying the frontier tribes in Assam 41 . It is too easy to assume that only the Pathans in the west gave trouble. The area immediately to the west was the only place where the Russians and English were neighbours, where their frontiers abutted the frontier of China in the Pamirs. The equivalent work to Lamb for this region is Alder". Alder demonstrates what you would expect, that the barrenness of the area made it unlikely that Russia would ever have been able to invade or to feint at India through Chitral. The English had enough difficulty supplying the garrisons necessary to support their claims to occupation. Alder may be supplemented by two articles by Indian scholars, Kanamori's account of the siege of Chitral 4 ®, and Kaushik's of British policy in SinkiangInteresting evidence of Russian policy in the Pamirs is provided by a translation of one of a number of pieces by the Russian scholar, Yuldashbayeva *\ After the Second Afghan War, and their failure to overawe Afghanistan, the English reverted to their preferred policy of relying upon a connexion with Persia to defend India. They were able to attempt this because Ripon had negotiated a satisfactory settlement with the Amir of Afghanistan. Despite the military defeats, Lytton's policy had been a political success. The English were to defend Afghanistan from foreign invasions, and were not to interfere in her internal affairs; in return the Amir would conduct his foreign relations through the Viceroy of India. The agreement provided a satisfactory basis for AngloAfghan relations for 30 years, once one long and most dangerous obstacle was surmounted, the Penjdeh Crisis of 1884/85. Until the frontiers of Afghanistan were delimited in agreement with Russia, the Amir was in a position to embarrass Anglo-Russian relations by pressing his claims to disputed territory. In addition to Singhal 4e , there is a short account of the Penjdeh Crisis in Mohl *
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. Three adequate surveys of Anglo-Afghan relations are Khan until the Second Afghan War 48 , Rastogi after it 4 ', and Ghose 60 . None of them adds mudi to the older work by Fraser Tytler 81 . The Russian viewpoint is presented in three other pieces by Yuldashbayeva The English were aiming to surround India by a chain of buffer states. Their interest in these states was negative, keeping out others and as far as possible themselves. Unfortunately, in the western and most important state this was impossible. Persia, unattended, would be overawed by Russia: a method had to be found of rejuvenation. As Mrs Greaves demonstrates, in the best book on the defence of India and in her subsequent series of articles the English tried for 20 years to discover how to rejuvenate Persia and failed ® 5 . Partly the difficulties were geographical. The developed part of Persia was the north west, close to the Russian frontier. To develop the south and south east, opening the rivers to navigation, and building the strategic railway into Seistan that Salisbury was continually demanding, would have been expensive. The Government of India did not have the money, and the English Government, aghast at the mounting cost of the naval building programme in the nineties, would not provide it M . The English had had a more sustained interest in Persia than in any other near eastern state throughout the 19th century". The reason was strategic. If India was to be defended in Asia, the war had to be fought as far as possible from India, to guard against the danger that an enemy advance, or an English reverse, might provoke rebellion. The English had often hoped to rely upon the effects of increased trade to reinvigorate Persia, and to solve their strategic dilemma for them. In the 1830's, with this in mind, they had encouraged trading to Azerbaijan through the Black Sea. As Issawi shows, by the end of the century the attempt had failed® 8 . The Russians had done better, as was to be expected, given the better communications in Northern Persia". They also had striking successes in influencing Persian railway building ,9 . After the fall of Bismarck, Germany, seeking outlets for her trade and energy, became a second rival to England in Persia' 1 . To Englishmen, German interest in the Near East was symbolized by their project for a Baghdad railway. Chapman provides an account of the English attitude to the railway e2 , and a recent article by Francis shows that it was the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, anxious to harness the anti-German public to his plans for tariff reform, who was responsible in 1903 for the surprising English refusal to join in building the railway" 3 . The English knew that it would be built without them, and that it would be wiser to obtain some control. There is also an useful note by Kumar on the sources for studying the attitude to this question of the Government of India". ω Between 1885 and 1905 all English statesmen agreed that India ought to be defended in the Near East, but it became increasingly difficult to decide how or where. As you might expect, the English would have preferred to defend India from the sea. Once they had occupied Egypt, as Aden was already theirs, they might effectively dominate the Red Sea®
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. Kelly catalogues the steps by whidi they had succeeded during the middle of the century in dominating the Persian Gulf. By the end here, too, the English were challenged. If books by Americans were not so often unreadable, the challenge from Frenchmen, Germans, and even Turks, might be followed in Busch ® 7 . A more slender but more readable account of the same period can be found in Kumar ® 8 . As Viceroy, Curzon made strenuous efforts between 1898 and 1904 to reassert English paramountcy in the Persian Gulf, what the Foreign Office called his prancing in the puddle, arguing that as Persia was increasingly overawed by Russia, from their position in the gulf, the English might still prevent this from affecting Luristan, Farsistan, and Seistan, the parts of Persia that strategically most mattered to them. English statesmen continued to wrestle with the problem of how to defend India years after their soldiers had abandoned it®'. During the 1890's Salisbury, whose scepticism of professionals was notorious, was offended, firstly that his admirals told him they would not risk forcing the Dardanelles, the assumption of the Punjab School, then that his soldiers claimed that they could no longer, as the Bombay Sdiool had assumed, take the offensive in Asia with any prospect of victory. In the middle of the century the English had debated the merits of rival strategies: by the end it appeared that they might have to renounce both. There was a solution, a German alliance. That they were being asked to defend India against Russia, for no equal return, for the English refused to defend AustriaHungary, was one reason why, during the famous negotiations between 1898 and 1901, the Germans were doubtful of the value of an English alliance. An alliance was no solution to Salisbury, who hated to commit himself, and preferred to deal directly with Russia 70 . One of the ironies that resulted from this situation was that after 1902, when the Foreign Office increasingly assumed that in any war England might be fighting Germany, the Committee of Imperial Defence 71 , the amateur English substitute for a General Staff, was still planning for a war against Russia. They still assumed that most of the English army would be needed in India. In a sense the celebrated shift in English policy associated with the permanent officials who worked for Sir Edward Grey 71 was the only solution to an otherwise insoluble strategic dilemma. In a fight with Germany w in Europe, it might be no easier to win than in a fight with Russia in Asia, but it would be easier not to lose. At sea the English felt they were bound to be superior. After 1905 Grey made this calculation explicit. The Anglo-Russian entente was a contribution to the balance of power in Europe. It was not to be handicapped by the problems of defending India. There is an useful study of the Liberal conception of imperial strategy by Williams 73 , and two books by Das 74 and Koss 75 reveal the influence of this priority upon the Liberal Secretary of State for India between 1905 and 1910, John Morley. Similarly, the likely effects of the entente, in increasing Russian pre-eminence in Persia, described by Greaves 7 ", were to be ignored. They might be ignored more easily for two reasons. By the terms of the entente the English had established their own pre-eminence in southern and eastern Persia. They had also found a solution to their strategic dilemma in the revised Anglo-Japanese alliance. Salisbury had been persuaded to agree to an alliance with Japan in 1902, when he had stoutly opposed an alliance with Germany, partly because it appeared to be impossible to deal directly with Russia 77 . The alliance, however, did nothing directly to defend India. After their victory over the Russians, the Japanese agreed to extend the alliance to the Near East. There is a detailed account of the alliance in NishAfter a century of searching the English had found somebody else to defend India. The English deserved to lose India as a result of being defeated by the Japanese in the Second World War. They had denounced their Japanese alliance after the First World War to suit colonists in Australia and New Zealand, who did not understand that it was the lyndipin of the English system of imperial defence 7 ". To function as a Great Power the English had to be careful not to place either their European or imperial interests before the other, not to commit their military power in either area. The funeral of Edward VII in 1910 has been rightly called the high point of the empire. For a moment the English were secure. They had an ally to defend India; as long as the powers of Europe remained nicely balanced, they would not need one. It is a pity that since the Second World War the English have worked at the diplomatic history of their empire more thoroughly than at the strategy for its defence. War is too serious a business to be treated seriously by Englishmen.
